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AEDPA'S "ADJUDICATION ON THE

MERITS" REQUIREMENT: COLLATERAL
REVIEW, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
ROBERT D. SLOANEt

"[H]abeascorpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very
tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in
subordinationto the proceedings, and although every form may
have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been
more than an empty shell.,,
INTRODUCTION

The modern law of federal habeas corpus is a labyrinth of
counterfactuals and arcane procedural hurdles that few state
petitioners manage to navigate-as Justice Blackmun once
wrote less charitably in dissent, "a Byzantine morass of
arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the
vindication of federal rights."2 The convoluted inquiries required
arise from the need to reconcile three developments of the past
four decades that remain in tension with one another: first, the
Warren Court's expansion of federal habeas relief, identified
with Fay v. Noia and its progeny; 3 second, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' curtailment of that expansion, identified with
Wainwright v. Sykes, 4 which partially overruled Fay,5 and
Coleman v. Thompson,6 which fully overruled it; 7 and third, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
f Clerk, Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The author acknowledges with gratitude the comments of
Judge Lynch and Molly Beutz.
1 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991);
see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
4 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
5 Id. at 87-88.
6 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
7 Id. at 750.
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(AEDPA).8 AEDPA to a certain extent codified, 9 and to another
extent modified, 10 judicial developments of the preceding four
decades. By common consensus, it did a poor job in both
respects. Because it "bears the influence of various bills that
were fiercely debated for nearly forty years," its "arcane
verbiage"" frequently generates difficult questions of statutory
interpretation.
Federal judges increasingly find themselves
engaged in correspondingly tortuous exercises of statutory
construction. Justice Souter, writing for the Court in Lindh v.
Murphy,12 captured the nucleus of the problem: "All we can say
is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a
3
silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."'
In this Comment, I suggest an answer to one of the multiple
questions of AEDPA statutory interpretation: What does it
mean for a state court to have "adjudicated" a habeas petitioner's
federal claim "on the merits"? AEDPA directs federal habeas
courts to extend a curious form of deference to decisions that
resulted from state-court adjudications on the merits. 14 Title 28
s Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the United States Code).
9 See generally Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real
Laws: The Pathologiesof the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the
PrisonLitigationReform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997).
10 Id. at 22-46.
11 Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L.

REV. 381, 381 (1996); see also Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review
for Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1868
(1997) ("As an amalgam of various drafts that Congress debated for almost forty
years and cobbled together in response to political events, the AEDPA trumpets its
complex history: many provisions are obscure and conflict with one another.").
12 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
13 Id. at 336.
14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). Deference is something of a misnomer. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 387 n.13 (2000). Justice Stevens, in Williams,
noted that § 2254 does not require deference "to state decisions, as if the
Constitution means one thing in Wisconsin and another in Indiana.... [nor
deference] after the fashion of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837...(1984), [which] depends on [congressional]
delegation." Id. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 868 (7th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). Still, § 2254 may be thought to
require a form of deference insofar as it regulates the circumstances under which a
federal court can issue habeas relief, viz., not when a state court's decision is
erroneous, but only when it appears, in the independent judgment of a federal court,
to be either "contrary to, or... an unreasonable application of, clearly established
[f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Williams,
529 U.S. at 376 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). The phrase "standard of review" is
probably a more accurate description of what § 2254(d)(1) prescribes.

2004]

'ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS"

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) divests federal courts of authority 15 to issue a
writ of habeas corpus unless a state-court adjudication on the
merits culminated "in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
[fjederal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States."1 6
This text, to say the least, resists coherent
exposition. 17 Even after Williams v. Taylor,'8 which sought to
clarify the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application"
clauses, 19 federal courts struggle to understand precisely what
§ 2254(d)(1) requires, to invest it with a meaning distinct from
the catalogue of familiar standards of appellate review. For
example, an unreasonable decision, the Second Circuit has
suggested, must contain "[s]ome increment of incorrectness
15 By "authority," I mean power to award the relief requested, i.e., to issue the
writ, not jurisdiction simpliciter. Section 2254 did not affect the latter. See infra
notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
16 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
17 I do not focus in this Comment on the debate, which continues despite
Williams, over the meaning of the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application"
clauses except to emphasize that whatever their "correct" meaning in theory, their
application in practice by federal judges confronted with diverse factual and mixedfact-and-law scenarios will not be uniform. Inevitably, they will be informed to
varying extents by responses to the factual stimuli of each case. See Brian Leiter,
Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,76 TEX. L. REV.
267, 269 (1997) ("[E]veryone commonly thought to be a Realist-Karl Llewellyn,
Jerome Frank, Underhill Moore, Felix Cohen, Leon Green, Herman Oliphant,
Walter Wheeler Cook, and Max Radin, among others-endorses the following
descriptive claim about adjudication: in deciding cases, judges respond primarily to
the stimulus of the facts."). For a recent thorough analysis of the meaning of the
clauses, see generally Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60

WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 677 (2003).
Is 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
19 In Williams, the Supreme Court sought to explain the "contrary to" and
"unreasonable application" clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and to provide
guidance to lower federal courts engaged in collateral review of state court
decisions. See id. at 403-13. Despite this effort, some view this portion of the
opinion in Williams as less than helpful. See, e.g., Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100,
111 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[W]e can only echo Justice O'Connor's virtually tautological
statement that to permit habeas relief under the 'unreasonable application' phrase,
a state court decision must be not only erroneous but also unreasonable."). Several
commentators explored the meaning of section 2254(d) in advance of the Supreme
Court's decision in Williams. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New
Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103 (1998);
Sharad Sushil Khandelwal, The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 96 MICH. L. REV. 434 (1997); Note, Rewriting the Great Writ:
Standardsof Review for Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C.§ 2254, 110 HARV.

L. REV. 1868 (1997).
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beyond error[, but] the increment need not be great; otherwise,
habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions 'so far off
20
the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.'
Whatever the merits of this formulation, it proves
dauntingly difficult to apply. To find a state-court decision not
wrong but unreasonably wrong, assuming this distinction makes
sense in the first place, 21 involves a highly fact-sensitive-and, it
should be emphasized, also highly politically sensitivejudgment. To render such a judgment will almost inevitably be
to impugn the integrity or competence of state-court judges. The
federal judiciary understandably hesitates to send this implicit
message. 22 It is also unclear whether this standard provides real
guidance. If a decision erroneously applies clearly established
federal law, what increment of error renders that misapplication
unreasonable?
In practice, the answer at times must be:
whatever increment of error a federal habeas court finds
necessary to justify its decision to issue the writ in
circumstances where justice manifestly requires it.23
Where a state court summarily dismisses a federal claim
without citation or explanation, neither the text of § 2254(d), nor
its construction in Williams, necessarily compels this result.
Federal courts must extend AEDPA's tortuous standard of
review only to state-court decisions that resulted from an
"adjudication" of a habeas petitioner's claim "on the merits." In
Sellan v. Kuhlman,24 the Second Circuit held that a state court
adjudicates a federal claim on the merits by reducing its
disposition to a judgment "with res judicata effect, that is based
20 Francis S., 221 F.3d at 111 (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion,
171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc)). But see Ides, supra note 17, at 690, 693-

97 (arguing that the "wrong-but-reasonable" construction of the "unreasonable
application" clause is inconsistent with both the statutory text and relevant
legislative history).
21 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 388-89.
22 See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (noting the "highly undesirable" state of affairs "of having federal courts
reviewing State court decisions on habeas frequently declare such decisions to be
not just mistaken but also unreasonable").
23 At other times, at least with regard to questions of the proper application of
clearly established federal law to a particular set of facts, a state court may decide a
question differently than its federal counterpart would have, but nonetheless in a
manner that falls within some zone of objective "reasonableness." In that case the
AEDPA standard arguably can be meaningfully applied. See Ides, supra note 17, at
691.
24

261 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2001).
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on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on . . .
procedural, or other, ground[s]." 25 Every other federal circuit,
with the possible exception of the First Circuit, has adopted
Notwithstanding this
some permutation of this view. 2 6
consensus, a summary dismissal of a federal claim by a state
appellate court should not, in my view, be deemed an
"adjudicat[ion] on the merits."
The few commentators to address this issue to date have
analyzed it by first reviewing the often subtle distinctions
between permutations of the Sellan rule adopted by the various
federal circuits, and then assigning different interpretive
weights to the textualism analyses, inferences of congressional
27
intent, and statutory policy objectives raised by those circuits.
I agree with those who conclude that cursory dismissals of
federal claims should not be deemed "adjudicat [ions] on the
merits" under § 2254(d); they should receive de novo habeas
review by a federal court. 28 And by no means do I discount the
significance of the factors discussed by the federal circuit courts.
Id. at 311.
See Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605-06 (3d Cir. 2002); accord Wright
v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2002); Neal v. Puckett,
239 F.3d 683, 686-87 (5th Cir. 2001); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000); Aycox v. Lytle,
196 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1999); James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th
Cir. 1999); Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999); Hennon v. Cooper,
109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997).
27 See Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the
Merits, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 223 (2002) (arguing that textual analysis, recent
jurisprudence, and policy considerations show that unexplained dismissals of
federal claims should be afforded AEDPA deference); Brittany Glidden, When the
State is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA's Adjudication Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 177, 181 (2002) (arguing that "federal courts should review
perfunctory state opinions de novo because granting deference in accordance with
§ 2254(d) to perfunctory state opinions cannot be done in a uniform and meaningful
manner"); William P. Welty, 'Adjudication on the Merits" Under the AEDPA, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 900, 925 (2003) (declining to endorse the approach of any
particular federal circuit, but arguing that it is imperative that the Supreme Court
"quickly and forcefully resolve" the question); Claudia Wilner, "We Would Not Defer
to That Which Did Not Exist" AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1444, 1472-74 (2002) (arguing that unexplained summary
dismissals should be analyzed under the "unreasonable application" clause, and
"that even though a silent state court opinion is an 'adjudication on the merits'
under § 2254(d), a federal court can and should review it de novo" because such an
approach would comport with congressional intent, respect federalism and comity
concerns, and discourage state courts from "mask[ing]" their failure to adjudicate
federal claims with silence).
28 See Glidden, supra note 27, at 181; Wilner, supra note 27, at 1473-74.
25
26
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But these analyses, I believe, fail adequately to appreciate the
sui generis role of habeas corpus in Anglo-American law and its
constitutional stature within the American legal system.
It is often said that habeas corpus is not an appeal, and this
assertion counts as a good reason to impose a host of procedural
limitations on the writ, most prominently, the doctrines of
exhaustion, procedural default, and the heightened standard of
prejudice required to justify habeas relief based even on an
acknowledged error. 29 But neither is federal habeas corpus a
mere procedural irritant that impedes the efficient operation of
state criminal justice systems. Nor is it simply another civil
action that Congress can, without limitation, extend, withhold,
modify, or otherwise tinker with as it sees fit. As Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of
our law cannot be too often emphasized. It differs from all
other remedies in that it is available to bring into question the
legality of a person's restraint and to require justification for
such detention .... It is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that

has treated the writ of habeas corpus as the basic safeguard of
freedom in the Anglo-American world ....

Its history and

function in our legal system and the unavailability of the writ
in totalitarian societies are naturally enough regarded as one of
the decisively differentiating factors between our democracy
30
and totalitarian governments.
Habeas corpus enjoys a unique status within our
constitutional system, evinced by jurisprudence extending back

29 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000) (discussing the exhaustion requirement);
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991) (discussing the procedural

default requirement). Compare Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631-32 & n.7
(1993) (holding that even where a federal habeas court finds error, it should grant
relief only if that error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict"') (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946)), with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that on
direct appeal, trial error may only be disregarded if it is found to be "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt").
30 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2692 (2004) (emphasizing the unique historical
and constitutional status of habeas corpus); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
798 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect
against illegal imprisonment, is written into the Constitution. Its use by courts
cannot in my judgment be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.");
Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867).
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hundreds of years and, of course, by the Suspension Clause. 31
The proper interpretation of § 2254(d) should be informed by an
appreciation of that status.
The argument advanced in this Comment relies on three
premises. First, the text of § 2254(d) is ambiguous-equally
legitimate canons of statutory construction could be invoked to
justify contrary conclusions about its meaning. Second, because
of that ambiguity, an alternative construction of § 2254(d) would
be equally-if not more-plausible, given the nature, history,
and jurisprudence of habeas corpus in the United States. Third
and finally, this alternative, which would not consider a cursory
dismissal of a federal claim to be an adjudication on the merits,
but would rather require some manifestation, however minimal,
of the state court's adjudicatory process in order for AEDPA
deference to apply-whether by citing federal law, citing state
law that applies federal law, or simply articulating a rationale
consistent with federal law-would be the better one. Not only
would it better serve the values of comity, federalism, and
judicial efficiency; more significantly, it would better preserve
the integrity of the sui generis mechanism of habeas corpus in
Anglo-American law. It would also spare federal courts the
convoluted, and often needless, counterfactual inquiries that can
in practice preclude the vindication of those rights where their
violation has led to an unlawful confinement.
Part I explores the origins of habeas corpus, reviews its
development relative to the states following the Civil War, and
briefly notes the countervailing trends that culminated in
Part II canvasses and appraises the competing
AEDPA.
interpretations of "adjudicated on the merits." Part III argues
that the "manifest adjudication" construction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) exhibits greater fidelity to the jurisprudential integrity
of habeas corpus. It then distinguishes the four scenarios
presented by cursory state-court judgments and considers which
construction of § 2254(d) better serves the federalism, comity,

31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2661
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The two ideas central to Blackstone's understanding
[of freedom from unlawful imprisonment]-due process as the right secured, and
habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon by a
citizen illegally imprisoned-found expression in the Constitution's Due Process and
Suspension Clauses.").

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.78:615

and judicial efficiency concerns that, at least nominally,
motivated AEDPA's habeas reforms.
Habeas corpus remains a vital safeguard of personal liberty
within our legal system; one of the paramount constitutional
mechanisms by which, as Madison wrote, "a double security
arises to the rights of the people. '32 We should acknowledge and
seek to ameliorate problems raised by the Great Writ's abuse by
persons incarcerated pursuant to state judgments. But the
integrity of habeas corpus need not be compromised by judicial
construction of an ambiguous statutory provision in a manner
arguably inconsistent with the writ's jurisprudential import and
status within our constitutional framework.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR PERSONS IN STATE CUSTODY

I.

Common Law JurisprudentialOrigins
The current statutes giving federal courts authority to issue
the writ, whatever else they seek to accomplish, do not purport
to redefine habeas corpus, 33 and therefore, "recourse must be had
to the common law, from which the term was drawn, and to the
decisions of [the Supreme] Court interpreting and applying the
common law principles which define its use when authorized by
the statute."3 4 Habeas corpus literally means "you have the
body." 35 Like the other prerogative writs at common law (e.g.,
mandamus, certiorari), it originated as a simple command from
the Crown to a subordinate directing that person to take some
action: for example, to produce a person confined so that he may
testify (habeas corpus ad testificandum), or be tried (habeas
corpus ad prosequendum).36 Ultimately, the common law courts

A.

32

THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);

see also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,

1961) (extolling the writ of habeas corpus as a principal bulwark of personal liberty
that the Constitution would ensure even in the absence of a bill of rights).
33 As a constitutional matter, it is not clear that Congress could statutorily
redefine the meaning of habeas corpus. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying
text.
34 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934).
35 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS 485 (2d ed. 2003) (citing II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW 593 n.4 (1898)).
36 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 130 (1768) (U. Chicago ed. 1979). See
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adapted these writs to serve judicial, rather than executive or
administrative, purposes. 37
The Great Writ, "the most
celebrated writ in English law,"3 in Blackstone's words, refers to
the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,3 9 which courts at
common law "directed to the person detaining another,...
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the
40
day and cause of his caption and detention."
Today, limitations on or expansions of the writ-its
jurisdictional reach and substantive scope-often connote
limitations on or expansions of federal power relative to the
states. At common law, needless to say, the writ bore no relation
to the uniquely American federalism and comity concerns that
preoccupy modern jurists and commentators. 41 The common-law
courts issued the writ to obtain the presence of persons initially
brought before local jurisdictions or ecclesiastical courts, and
42
later, to thwart injunctions issued by the Lord Chancellor.
Before the merger of law and equity, the writ served to secure
the appearance of, and thereby to release, persons detained by
the Chancellor, typically for violating his injunction not to sue at
common law. 43 In its origin, therefore, habeas corpus had no
relation to appellate review. 44 It constituted a procedural device
in the arsenal of the common-law courts for testing the reason
for, and later the legality of, a person's detention. The only
generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 1263 (1980) (giving an overview of the English origins of habeas corpus).
37 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 57,

173 (5th ed. 1956).
38 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 102.
39 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807)).
40 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 131; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709.
41 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (analyzing the history and
use of federal habeas corpus in the United States).
42 See DUKER, supra note 36, at 27, 33-35. Initially, the common law courts
used the writ to protect their jurisdiction from infringement by a variety of other
tribunals. By the time of Chambers's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1629), however,
"[t]he questioning of the validity of commitments, previously an incidental effect of
the writ.... became the major object." DUKER, supra note 36, at 46.
43 PLUCKNETT, supra note 37, at 57.
44 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 430 n.45 (1961) (noting that the
equation of "habeas corpus jurisdiction with direct Supreme Court appellate review
is of recent vintage," and ascribing this error to Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953)).
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questions cognizable on habeas were those that could justify
release of the incarcerated person. 45 The common-law courts did
not review the Chancellor's exercise of equitable power; they
issued the writ to open the prison doors and secure the
appearance of a person.
B. Inheritance in the United States and the Suspension Clause
The American colonies knew the writ of habeas corpus,
albeit in different forms, as part of their jurisprudential
inheritance, and "the common-law writ of habeas corpus was in
operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in
1776."46 This raises the vital constitutional question of what,
precisely, the Suspension Clause guarantees. It provides that
"[tihe privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." 47
Two common textual
observations inform, but fall far short of resolving, its meaning.
First, the Clause appears to presuppose the existence of the writ,
and speak only to the circumstances under which it may be
suspended.
Second, because it appears in Article I, it
presumably limits the power of Congress. 48 It does not imply
that Article III federal courts, first brought into existence by the
Constitution and Judiciary Act of 1789, would enjoy common-law
authority to issue the writ. Nor, however, does it necessarily
imply the contrary.
Absent dispositive textual evidence, scholars have looked for
evidence of original intent in the framing and ratification
debates. 49 But most concede that these sources, too, provide
scant guidance. 50
They speak almost exclusively to the
45 See McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-38 nn.1-4 (1934); see also DUKER,
supra note 36, at 42.
46 DUKER, supra note 36, at 115; see also id. at 99-115 (surveying the writ's
history in each of the colonies).
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
48 Only once has the President's authority to suspend the writ been considered.
See Ex parte Merrymen, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)
(concluding that only Congress, not the President, can suspend the writ); see also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2660-61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Absent
suspension [by Congress] ....
the Executive's assertion of military exigency has not
been thought sufficient to permit detention without charge.").
49 See Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 451, 455-57 (1996).
50 Id. at 455.
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51
circumstances, if any, which could or should justify suspension.
Early cases prove similarly sparse and uninformative, in part
because incarceration did not become the standard form of
52
criminal punishment until the early to mid-nineteenth century.
On one, the
Nonetheless, at least two views predominate.
Suspension Clause guarantees only state judicial authority to
issue the writ to prisoners in federal custody. 53 On another,
assuming only that Congress elects to establish inferior Article
III courts, the Clause constitutes a source of self-executing
federal judicial power to issue the writ. 54 Still another view,
espoused by Justice Scalia among other contemporaries, holds
that the Clause regulates congressional power to suspend the

51 See YACKLE, supra note 35, at 487. But see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most
Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 146 (1952); Eric
M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
451 (1996) (arguing that we can infer from this silence that the participants in the
framing and ratification of the Constitution presupposed the existence of the writ).
For two analyses of the evidence that reach contrary conclusions, see DUKER, supra
note 36, at 126-56; ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT
WRIT OF LIBERTY 12-19 (2001).
52 See Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1995).
53 See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 36, at 126-35; Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509-10 (1987).
54 See Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J.
605, 607; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 19 (concluding that the Suspension
Clause contemplated that both federal and state courts would enjoy authority to
issue the writ to release persons in both state and federal custody). Professor
Freedman argued that the prevailing wisdom relies on a mistaken reading of Chief
Justice Marshall's seminal decision in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75
(1807). In fact, Congress gave the federal courts authority to issue the writ on behalf
of prisoners in state custody by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Suspension
Clause protects that right. See FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 2-4, 9-19. For a
similar reading of Ex parte Bollman, suggesting that Chief Justice Marshall may
have assumed only that the Suspension Clause would not be "self-enforcing" vis-Avis the federal courts, see Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention,
and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 975-76 (1998) (arguing that
even if the Suspension Clause did not originally contemplate federal jurisdiction to
review the legality of custody pursuant to state judgments, "the classic solution of
Henry Hart affords a persuasive method for vindicating the Suspension Clause:
once habeas jurisdiction has been conferred, the constitutionality of its withdrawal
can be reviewed, and general jurisdictional grants-like the federal habeas corpus
statute and the federal question jurisdiction statute---confer authority to review the
constitutionality of limitations on jurisdiction") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1387-88, 1396-98 (1953) and Thunder Basin Coal
Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 n.23 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
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writ only if Congress elects to confer that authority on the
federal courts in the first place; it does not prevent Congress
from eliminating federal judicial authority to issue the writ
altogether. 55 The Supreme Court has carefully avoided resolving
the original meaning of the Suspension Clause, instead
employing it as an interpretive device, via the canon of
constitutional doubt, to tip the balance in favor of constructions
of ambiguous statutes that avoid Suspension Clause concerns. 56
Yet we need not accept a particularly robust view of the
original intent of the authors of the Suspension Clause in order
to appreciate the constitutional concerns raised by congressional
limitations on or modifications of the writ relative to persons
incarcerated pursuant to a state-court judgment.
First,
whatever the original meaning of the Suspension Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment arguably incorporated the privilege of
habeas corpus against the states.5 7 Just as the Amendment
reoriented much of the initial focus of the Bill of Rights from
federal infringement of states' rights to state infringement of
individual rights, it also modified the import of the Suspension
Clause, making its existence as a remedy for persons in state
custody indispensable to the newly paramount concern with
state infringement of the federal rights of citizens. 58 Second,
even if we reject this theory, the statutory existence of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction remains. Arguably, Congress can
extend or withhold this jurisdiction. It does not follow that if

55 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337-38 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); but
see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2660-74 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(extolling the Suspension Clause in a distinct context and arguably implying a
contrary view). Without unnecessarily digressing far into the Suspension Clause
debate, I would note that it seems implausible that the Constitution would regulate
Congress's authority to suspend something that need not exist in the first place or
enshrine a protection against suspension of a privilege that can be revoked
absolutely.
56 See, e.g., INS, 533 U.S. at 299-300; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
223 (1952). See generally Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 34548 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining the canon of constitutional doubt).

57 See

AKHIL

REED

AMAR,

THE

BILL

OF

RIGHTS:

CREATION

AND

RECONSTRUCTION 175-76 (1998).
58 See generally id. (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally
transformed the nature of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, repackaging
what were originally structural protections against federal aggrandizement of
power as protections for individuals against governmental power generally, and in
particular, that of the states); Jordan Steiker, Incorporatingthe Suspension Clause,
92 MICH. L. REV. 862 (1994).
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Congress chooses to extend it, it can also modify the sui generis
meaning of habeas corpus by rendering it, in effect, an awkward
form of federal appellate review of state-court judgments. The
writ, in nature and import, remains "antecedent to statute, and
throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law." 59
Under all but the most restrictive view of the Suspension
Clause, then, the question remains whether Congress can leave
federal jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus intact but,
in effect if not name, conflate its meaning with appellate review.
That proposition is highly doubtful, for it relies on the so-called
"greater power" syllogism, that
[I]f a unit of government (typically Congress) enjoys a "greater"
(encompassing) power to take or forbear some significant
action, it follows as a logical imperative that it also enjoys a
"lesser" (subset) power to take or forbear some less sweeping
action ....[But] [t]ypically, the power said to be the "greater"
does exist, but the power said to be the "lesser" is not (as a
logical matter) a subset power at all. Instead, it is a different
60
(though related) power.
This fallacy applies in the context of limits on federal habeas
jurisdiction relative to the states. Congress arguably retains the
power to extend or withhold from the federal courts habeas
jurisdiction over persons in state custody. It does not follow,
however, that Congress may extend that jurisdiction, but then
redefine habeas corpus in a manner that threatens its unique
status as a collateral remedy for protecting and vindicating the
right to freedom from unlawful confinement.
The major
historical point that matters here is that habeas corpus is
emphatically not-in its origins or nature-an appeal. Judicial
construction of AEDPA's habeas provisions should respect this
distinction.
C.

Transformationand Reorientation:The Evolution of the Writ
Relative to the States

By conventional account, Congress first authorized the
federal courts to grant habeas relief to prisoners in state custody

59 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (citations omitted); see also Rasul v.
Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2692 (2004).
60 YACKLE, supra note 35, at 8-9.
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after the Civil War. 61 Some scholars contest this view. 62 But it
suffices to note that Congress unambiguously supplied the
federal courts with power to grant the writ to persons in state
custody in 1867.63 That same year, the Supreme Court declared
that habeas corpus guards against "every possible case of
privation of liberty contrary to the Constitution, treaties, or
laws,"64 and in the intervening 150 years before AEDPA, it has
proved an invaluable tool for protecting-and admittedly also
elaborating--constitutional rights. Notwithstanding judicial and
statutory modifications since 1867, most procedural, federal
habeas jurisdiction, and the corresponding right it confers on
persons in state custody, remains available today.
The federal courts seldom invoked it, however, until the
celebrated 1923 case of Moore v. Dempsey.65 Eight years earlier,
in Frank v. Mangum,66 Justice Holmes's powerful dissent from
the denial of federal habeas corpus, after a state trial conducted
in an atmosphere permeated by anti-Semitism and the threat of
imminent mob violence in the event of an acquittal, set the stage
for a more robust application of the writ. Holmes emphasized
that habeas corpus "cuts through all forms and goes to the very
tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in
subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may
have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been
more than an empty shell." 67 The majority in Frank, while
declining to issue the writ on the facts, agreed with Justice
Holmes on the law, affirming that "it is open to the courts of the
United States upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus to
look beyond forms and inquire into the very substance of the
68
matter."
In Brown v. Allen,69 the Court explained that despite the
unavoidable appellate overtones of habeas corpus, a federal
61

Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 374-75 n.7 (2000); DANIEL J. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA 56

(1966). See generally DUKER, supra note 36, at 181-211 (discussing the history of
federal habeas for persons in state custody).
62 See FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 12-19; Paschal, supra note 54, at 607.
63 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
64 Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867).
65 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
66 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
67 Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 331; see also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-92 (1923).
69 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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court's role on habeas consists not in a review of the state court's
judgment, still less in an inquiry into the petitioner's guilt or
innocence. 70 It consists in a direct appraisal of the merits of the
71
petitioner's claim that he or she has been unlawfully confined.
Justice
Frankfurter,
concurring,
posited
that
"[s]tate
adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus
statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these questions
that the federal judge is commanded to decide." 72 In Fay v.
Noia,73 Justice Brennan further clarified that:
[W]hile our appellate function is concerned only with the
judgments or decrees of state courts, the habeas corpus
jurisdiction.., is not so confined.
The jurisdictional
prerequisite is not the judgment of a state court but detention
simpliciter.... Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal
liberty; when that right is denied and a person confined, the
federal court has the power to release him. Indeed it has no
other power; it cannot revise the state court judgment; it can
74
act only on the body of the petitioner.
70 Id. at 463-65; see also id. at 506 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Professor
Freedman persuasively argued that Brown did not work any radical change in the
law or concept of federal habeas corpus and that neither the Court nor the general
public perceived it that way at the time. See FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 95-143.
In particular, in Brown, contrary to the views expressed in a well-known article by
Professor Paul M. Bator, "[tihe question of whether or not the federal courts should,
in Bator's words, 're-determine the merits of federal constitutional questions
decided in state criminal proceedings' was not a point of contention. No one doubted
that, as had been clear since Frank, or, at the very least since Moore, this was
precisely their role." Id. at 96 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 500 (1963))
(footnotes omitted). The majority of sitting Supreme Court justices evidently agree.
See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478-80 (1991) (Opinion of Kennedy, J., joined
by five other members of the Court); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299-300
(1992) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 See Brown, 344 U.S. at 465 (explaining that when a district court rules on a
habeas corpus application, it "is not an act of judicial clemency but a protection
against illegal custody").
72 Id. at 506 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Taken literally, Justice Frankfurter's
view could be thought to preclude AEDPA deference entirely. But the standard of
review mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) does not require federal courts to accept
state-court adjudications as "binding," only as entitled to deference.
73 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
74 Id. at 430-31; see also id. at 423-24 (observing the "traditional
characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as an original... civil remedy for the
enforcement of the right to personal liberty, rather than as a stage of the state
criminal proceedings or as an appeal therefrom") (footnote omitted). See generally
Lee, supra note 19, at 107 (describing the intellectual tension between the
theoretical nature of habeas corpus as an original civil action and its practical
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For that reason, doctrines of preclusion and the full faith
and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, do not apply to federal
habeas proceedings, 75 a corollary of the common-law rule that
"res judicata did not attach to a court's denial of habeas relief."76
In the 1960s, federal habeas corpus became a principal
procedural vehicle for vindicating federal rights infringed by the
states, particularly in the context of state trials infected by racial
prejudice and the burgeoning field of constitutional criminal
procedure. 77 Substantively, the incorporation doctrine made
federal constitutional rights enforceable against the states;
procedurally, habeas corpus provided the vehicle to vindicate
78
those rights.
Even after the Burger and Rehnquist Courts began to
curtail federal habeas corpus in the name of comity and
federalism, 79 the essential principle articulated in Fay-that
federal habeas corpus is neither an appeal from nor a review of a
state judgment, but an original civil action 8°-remained

appellate character in the context of the review of the legality of a state prisoner's
custody); Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 9, at 403 (same).
75 Fay, 372 U.S. at 423 (emphasizing "the familiar principle that res judicata is
inapplicable in habeas proceedings"); see also Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 124-25
(1968); DUKER, supra note 36, at 6; cf. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
485 n.27 (1982) (holding full faith and credit not applicable in habeas corpus
proceedings); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8, 14-15 (1963) (noting the same
in the context of a § 2255 motion, the analogue to habeas corpus for prisoners in
federal custody pursuant to a federal criminal conviction, and collecting cases).
76 McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277, 299-300 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230
(1924) ("At common law, the doctrine of res judicata did not extend to a decision on
habeas corpus refusing to discharge the prisoner.") (citing Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365, 378 (1902), and Exparte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 658 (1913)).
77 See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041 (1977); see also YACKLE,
supra note 35, at 494 ("By the middle 1960s, habeas corpus proceedings under the
authority of § 2241 and § 2254 had become the procedural analog of the Warren
Court's innovations in criminal procedure, providing the federal machinery for
bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete cases.").
78 See William J. Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 424 (1961).
79 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) ("In the habeas context,
the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is grounded
in concerns of comity and federalism."); see also id. at 758 (Blackmun J., dissenting)
("Federalism; comity; state sovereignty; preservation of state resources; certainty:
The majority methodically inventories these multifarious state interests [to support
its holding].").
80 See supranote 73-75 and accompanying text.
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theoretically intact.
In Wainwright v. Sykes,81 the Court
overruled Fay's "deliberate bypass" rule in the context of a
petitioner's failure to object contemporaneously to the admission
of an allegedly inadmissible confession.8 2 But it did not revise
Fay's articulation of the scope of federal habeas. To the contrary,
the Court explicitly reaffirmed it:
[S]ince Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), it has been the rule
that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained...
in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have
the federal habeas court make its own independent
determination of his federal claim, without being bound by the
determination on the merits of that claim reached in state
proceedings. This rule of Brown v. Allen is in no way changed
83
by our holding today.
And in Coleman v. Thompson,8 4 which established the
modern normative framework for federal habeas jurisprudence,
viz., a paramount concern with the values of federalism and
comity,8 5 the Court nonetheless reiterated that unlike direct
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, where the Court reviews a
state court's 'judgment," in a federal habeas corpus action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal district or circuit court
"must decide whether the petitioner is 'in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' The
court does not review a judgment, but the lawfulness of the
8 6 Habeas corpus is an original
petitioner's custody simpliciter."
civil action, not an appeal, and to conflate them threatens a
unique feature of Anglo-American law.
D. Conclusion
The collateral nature of federal habeas corpus remains its
theoretical bedrock, whatever the Suspension Clause guaranteed
in 1789.87 If federal habeas continues to mean anything for a
person incarcerated pursuant to a state-court judgment, it is
81 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
501 U.S. 722 (1991).
See id. at 726 ("This is a case about federalism. It concerns the respect that
federal courts owe the States and the States' procedural rules when reviewing the
claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus.").
86 Id. at 730 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963)).
87 See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
82

83
84
85
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that if that person claims to be in custody in violation of the
"Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," it must be
open to a federal habeas court to look beyond or behind the form
of the state proceedings and inquire into the substance-that is,
into the merits-of the petitioner's federal claim. Comity and
the avoidance of duplicative judicial work may counsel some
88
deference to the state court's resolution of a federal claim,
particularly if that resolution is inextricably intertwined with
questions of fact. But if the state court did not adjudicate a
federal claim on the merits, then comity applies differently or
not at all. If the state court declined to adjudicate a federal
claim on the merits because of a state procedural rule, comity
applies not to the substance of the court's decision but to respect
89
for the integrity of and values served by that procedural rule.
If the state court declined to adjudicate a claim on the merits
because it either failed to perceive or misperceived the nature of
a federal question, we need to ask more precisely what comity
means in this distinct context, and why it should or should not
be extended. 90
Despite the constriction of federal habeas corpus in recent
decades, the principle proclaimed by Justice Holmes in his
dissent in Frank-thata federal habeas court must look beyond
the form of the state proceedings and inquire into the cause (and
constitutionality) of the petitioner's detention-remains the
touchstone of federal habeas corpus. Without it, the distinction
between habeas corpus and appellate review becomes nebulous.
It is undoubtedly a curious concept. In practice, of course, a
federal court reviewing the legality of a state's incarceration of a
habeas petitioner must in some sense review the judgment that
88 See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 329 (1915) ("[W]here, as here, a
criminal prosecution has proceeded through all the courts of the State, including the
appellate as well as the trial court, the result of the appellate review cannot be
ignored when afterwards the prisoner applies for his release on the ground of a
deprivation of Federal rights sufficient to oust the State of its jurisdiction to proceed

to judgment and execution against him.").
89 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-32 (1991); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977).
90 Comity connotes a number of different values and meanings, some of which
remain in tension with one another. For example, comity implies respect for the
finality of a state court decision, but it also implies that state courts, equally with
their federal counterparts, can and will fairly adjudicate federal questions. The
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) may well be influenced by which of these
meanings we have in mind in considering the question.
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put him there. But the collateral nature of habeas corpus review
remains a peculiar feature of Anglo-American law firmly rooted
in history, intimately tied to the protection of personal liberty in
the American constitutional framework, and indelibly enshrined
in state and federal jurisprudence, not least by the Suspension
Clause. 91 To conflate appellate review of a judgment with
habeas review of the lawfulness of custody would be to disregard
the Great Writ's distinctive jurisprudential import.
The Court therefore should avoid, and in general has
avoided, rulings that threaten to produce that result. But
Congress, like the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, evidently felt,
in Justice Blackmun's words, "exasperation with the breadth of
substantive federal habeas doctrine and the expansive protection
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
fundamental fairness in state criminal proceedings;" and AEDPA
can accordingly be understood, in part, as the legislative
analogue to the Court's "crusade to erect petty procedural
barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking review of
92
federal constitutional claims."
AEDPA reformed, but did not purport to eliminate or
redefine, federal habeas corpus. In fact, the Senate rejected an
amendment offered by Senator Kyl that would have all but
93
eliminated federal habeas "review" of state judgments.
Instead, AEDPA seeks to make federal habeas corpus more
efficient in "two basic ways: directly, by setting time limits on
various litigation steps, and indirectly, by providing" a new
standard of review, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 94 The
former seems to be counterproductive insofar as it encourages
state prisoners immediately to file, and hence to flood the federal
courts with, habeas petitions, lest the statute of limitations
foreclose their right to file in the future. 95 The latter, depending
on its judicial construction, threatens to modify the
jurisprudential nature and import of habeas corpus. It is in this
regard that defining "adjudicated on the merits" can become
particularly significant.

91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
92 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 758-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93 141 CONG. REC. S7835, S7849 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see Yackle,

supra note 11, at 398-401 (providing a summary of the floor debate).
94 FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 153.
95 I owe this observation to Judge Gerard E. Lynch.
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DEFINING THE PROBLEM: FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
"REVIEW" AFTER AEDPA

In 1996, after some forty years of debate, Congress enacted
AEDPA. 96
Notwithstanding significant procedural changes
designed to enhance the efficient resolution of federal habeas
claims, AEDPA did not purport to deprive the federal courts of
habeas corpus jurisdiction, nor even to diminish that
jurisdiction. 97 Instead, as Professor Yackle explains, § 2254(d)
shifted the focus of the federal courts' merits analysis by
mandating that it take "the state court adjudication as the
baseline-that is, as the object of the federal courts' exercise of
independent judgment."98
Under § 2254(d), a federal court is not to take up a claim as
though it were writing on a clean slate, perhaps mentioning a
previous state court judgment in passing. By contrast, the
federal court is to begin with the work already done on the
claim in state court and ask, first and foremost, whether the
state arrived at the correct outcome. In this way, the federal
court takes serious account (but not controlling account) of the
best available thinking on the claim at bar-the prior
adjudication of that claim in state court. 99
Where a state court adjudicates a federal claim on the
merits, that is, AEDPA prescribes the standard of review to be
applied to the result of that adjudication. Rather than review
the petitioner's federal claim de novo, a federal habeas court
reviews the result of the state court's adjudication on that
federal claim under the AEDPA standard. Hence, "when the
state court has addressed the federal constitutional issue, it is its
ultimate outcome, and not its rationalization, which is the

96 See Yackle, supra note 11, at 381.
97 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378 (2000) ("The inquiry mandated by the
amendment relates to the way in which a federal habeas court exercises its duty to
decide constitutional questions; [it] does not alter the underlying grant of
jurisdiction in § 2254(a).") (citations omitted); see also Yackle, supra note 11, at 398
(emphasizing that "[b]y its explicit terms, § 2254(d) presupposes the basic habeas
jurisdiction established by the 1867 Act" and that the proponents of AEDPA
"expressly disclaimed any purposes to touch the habeas jurisdiction").
98 Yackle, supra note 11, at 442.
99 Id. at 383; accord Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255
(11th Cir. 2002); Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing
that the statutory text of § 2254(d) focuses on the result rather than the reasoning

process of the state court).
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focus."'10 0 Section 2254(d)(1) thereby avoids compromising the
integrity of a federal court's independent judgment on federal
law.' 0 1 A federal habeas court continues to exercise independent
judgment on federal issues, but its jurisdiction to issue the writ,
its remedial power, no longer extends to every case in which its
analysis would have differed from that of the state court. The
desirability of this restrictive modification of the operation of
federal habeas corpus remains highly debatable. But it does
comport with federal habeas corpus's traditional role as a device
to prevent unlawful confinements, not to correct errors of federal
law per se.
This shift in the object of federal judicial judgment, however,
self-evidently makes the question whether the state court
adjudicated a federal claim on the merits critical. A state court
decision based on an adjudication supplies the baseline, the
conditio sine qua non, for the application of § 2254(d)(1)'s
tortuous standard of review. Absent a decision that resulted
from an adjudication on the merits, the federal court must
review the merits of the habeas petitioner's constitutional claims
de novo.' 0 2 That which does not exist, as many federal circuits
03
courts have said, cannot be reviewed under any standard.

100Dibenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001).
101 Yackle, supra note 11, at 383 ("[Flederal [habeas] adjudication remains
independent; it is just that the question on which independent federal judgment is
brought to bear is whether, after adjudicating the merits of the claim, the state
court reached the correct conclusion."). Indeed, as Professor Yackle observed, the
contrary understanding, making "the [federal] district court's decision-making
power... contingent on the quality of the previous state court judgment," would
raise non-trivial constitutional concerns. Id. at 446.
It would mean that, by
§ 2254(d), Congress purported, not to interfere with the object of the federal court's
review, but rather to condition the federal court's independent judgment on matters
of federal law. This proposition has been, according to most views, foreclosed by
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See also Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222-24 (1995). Justice Stevens cautioned against this view
in Williams, 529 U.S. at 378-79, where he emphasized that
[w]hen federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction under the
"judicial Power" of Article III of the Constitution, it is "emphatically the
province and duty" of those judges to "say what the law is." At the core of
this power is the federal courts' independent responsibility-independent
from the coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent
from the separate authority of the several states-to interpret federal law.
Id. (citations omitted).
102 See Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001).
103 See, e.g., Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.
2002).
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Where no adjudication exists, a federal court must reorient its
review to focus on the traditional habeas inquiry into the legality
under federal law of the petitioner's detention itself, applying the
pre-AEDPA, de novo standard.104
Still, it would be unrealistic, even counterproductive, not to
acknowledge that a federal habeas petitioner will often appeal
his or her conviction on any, even remotely, plausible federal
ground. State courts therefore will at times-not unjustifiably
and in the interest of judicial efficiency-decline to address in
detail each federal ground raised. Instead, they will dispose of
some claims with a boilerplate phrase summarily dismissing
those claims not specifically addressed as "without merit." This
practice raises difficult questions: Can, and if so should, a
federal court consider summary dispositions like this to be
adjudications on the merits such that § 2254(d)(1)'s standard
applies? Does a state court adjudicate a federal claim on the
merits if it neglects to cite or apply federal law, or to rely on
state court precedents that cite or apply federal law, or to
otherwise indicate that it understood and analyzed any properly
preserved federal claims on the merits? On the one hand, we
have no reason to assume that a decision dismissing federal
claims as "without merit" does not constitute "adjudication" of
those claims.
But absent affirmative evidence in either
direction, the question becomes how federal courts exercising
habeas, not appellate, jurisdiction should analyze such cursory
state-court decisions. In Washington v. Schriver,10 5 the Second
Circuit succinctly staked out competing answers to this
1 06
question.
A.

Adjudication on the Merits as Reduction to a Judgment with
Res JudicataEffect
The predominant, if not consensus, position equates
"adjudicated on the merits" with "decided by a judicial officer
on

104 Id.
at 1253-54; see also Fortini,257 F.3d at 47; Schoenberger v. Russell, 290
F.3d 831, 842-43 (6th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases).
105 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001), withdrawing240 F.3d 101 (2001).
106 Id.
at 52-55 (explaining the competing positions but declining to decide the
issue because it would not affect the resolution of the petitioner's federal claim).
This decision superseded a prior one by the same panel, which had reached and
resolved the question in favor of the position ultimately rejected by the Second
Circuit in Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311-12 (2d Cir. 2001). See Washington
v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 107-10 (2001), withdrawn, 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001).
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the merits and reduced to a judgment accordingly."10 7 This view
has several purported virtues. First, it appears to comport with
the new mode of federal habeas review established by AEDPA,
viz., that a federal court should take the state court's decision,
not the analytic process by which it reached that decision, as the
baseline for its independent review. "[W]e are determining the
reasonableness of the state courts' 'decision,"' the Second Circuit
remarked somewhat glibly, "not grading their papers."10 8 This
does not mean that the state court's adjudicatory process
becomes irrelevant; only that, ultimately, the result, not the
quality of the state court's reasoning, must be the object of
independent federal judgment. While "sound reasoning will
enhance the likelihood that a state court's ruling will be
determined to be a 'reasonable application' of Supreme Court
law, deficient reasoning will not preclude AEDPA deference, at
least in the absence of an analysis so flawed as to undermine
confidence that the constitutional claim has been fairly
adjudicated."' 1 9 Second, the predominant construction may
further the value of comity in the sense that it allegedly deters
"federal court supervision of the states' criminal processes and
increase[s] deference to state judicial decisions," and in the same
vein, heeds the Supreme Court's counsel against requiring state
courts to use 'particular language in every case in which a state
prisoner presents a federal claim." ' 110 Finally, it may be thought
to furnish the appropriate textual analysis to the extent that the
definition of adjudication in Black's Law Dictionary and the
familiar meaning of "adjudicated on the merits" in the res
judicata context suggest that this word should receive the same
meaning in the habeas context. 1'
In Sellan v. Kuhlman," 2 in which the Second Circuit
adopted the predominant construction of "adjudicated on the
merits," 113 Chief Judge Walker expanded on these themes. The
court noted at the outset that "whether AEDPA deference
107

Washington, 255 F.3d at 53.

108 Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001); accord Wright, 278 F.3d at

1255; Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997).
109 Cruz, 255 F.3d at 86 (citations omitted).
110 Washington, 255 F.3d at 53 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
739 (1991)); cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 7 (1995).
111 Washington, 255 F.3d at 53.
112 261 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2001).
113

Id. at 311.
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applies here is all but outcome-determinative."1' 14 In the main, it
justified its conclusion as a simple textual analysis, as have
other circuits. 115 It said that "'[a]djudicated on the merits' has a
well-settled meaning: a decision finally resolving the parties'
claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of
the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other,
ground."11 6
The court acknowledged that a state court's
reference to federal law, whether directly or by way of a state
decision citing relevant federal precedents, would facilitate a
federal habeas court's analysis."17 But it disclaimed any license
from Congress absolving the federal courts from performing that
analysis in the absence of indicia of the state court's reasoning
8
process."1
The Second Circuit panel in Sellan also went out of its way
to reject the position of Judge Calabresi, who, concurring in
Washington v. Schriver,119 had urged that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) be
construed such that "AEDPA deference does not apply where a
State court has rejected a petitioner's claim without expressly
mentioning its federal aspects."' 20 This construction, Judge
Calabresi argued, would "enable[] State courts to choose whether
or not they wish to take on the burden [of deciding federal, and
particularly difficult constitutional, issues] and be deferred
to." 2' It would advance the goals of comity and federalism by
giving state courts a signaling device by which they could either
command deference or elect to avoid passing on federal issues,
leaving them for federal habeas courts to decide de novo.
Because the text of § 2254(d) could bear this construction, in
Judge Calabresi's view, it should be adopted as the one that best
"comports with" the spirit underlying the AEDPA.' 22
The Sellan panel disagreed with Judge Calabresi's proposal
for two principal reasons: First, it might encourage defendants

114

115

2002).

Id. at 310.
See, e.g., Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254-55 (11th Cir.

116 Sellan, 261 F.3d
117 Id. at 311-12.
118 Id.

at 311.

119See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 61-65 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring), withdrawing 240 F.3d 101 (2001).
120 Id. at 63.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 63-64.
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to sandbag, "to press their federal claims in state court in an
essentially cursory manner-just enough to exhaust state
remedies and to avoid default or waiver... with the hope that
the state court will not 'refer to' or engage in any lengthy
discussion of their federal claims, thus entitling the prisoner to
de novo" federal habeas review. 123 Second, the Supremacy
Clause mandates that state courts address properly presented
federal claims; it does not permit them to choose whether 1to
24
leave federal questions to federal courts on habeas review.
The former reason strikes me as questionable at best; a risky
and ill-advised defense strategy at worst. The latter reason,
however, strikes me as clearly correct: State courts must decide
properly presented federal questions. The Constitution does not
permit them to choose. Furthermore, the idea that federal
courts should give state judges a choice-either decide the
difficult federal questions, thereby insulating your decisions
from federal habeas scrutiny, or deliberately avoid deciding
them, passing them on to federal courts (presumably) better
equipped to handle them-also may seem somewhat
condescending.
At the same time, it is far from clear that the Sellan rule
avoids the Supremacy Clause problem, for it raises a distinct,
If a state court declines
but equally practical, concern.
manifestly to decide a question under the correct federal
standard, then under Sellan, federal courts must presume that
the court addressed the question, provided only that the state
court did not dispose of it on a procedural ground. State judges,
by declining to address federal questions and dismissing them as
one among many claims either unpreserved for appellate review
or without merit, could therefore enjoy the benefit of deference
without the burden of actually adjudicating a federal claim.
This, too, could enable and perhaps even encourage state judges
to avoid their responsibility properly to adjudicate federal
constitutional issues under the Supremacy Clause, particularly
in circumstances where vindicating a federal right despite the
defendant's guilt of an incendiary crime would be politically
unpopular.

123 Sellan, 261 F.3d at 313-14.

124 Id. at 314.
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B. Adjudicated on the Merits as Manifest Analysis of Federal
Claims
With the possible exception of the First Circuit, 125 all of the
federal circuits have, with minor variations, embraced in
substance if not form, the construction of § 2254(d) articulated in
Sellan.'26
The alternative
construction canvassed in
Washington, but adopted to date by no court, takes as its point of
departure the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Taylor.127
There, a plurality held that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable
application" clauses have distinct meanings:
125 In DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001), the First Circuit said that
"[i]f the state court has not decided the federal constitutional claim (even by

reference to state court decisions dealing with federal constitutional issues), then we

cannot say that the constitutional claim was 'adjudicated on the merits' within the
meaning of § 2254 and therefore entitled to the deferential review prescribed in
subsection (d)." Id. at 6. But in that case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
manifestly resolved the petitioner's claims on the basis of state law. See id. at 5-6.
The court then cited Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000), for the
proposition that pre-AEDPA review applies where a state court decision manifestly
rests on state statutory construction. DiBenedetto, 272 F.3d at 6-7. Similarly, in
Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001), the First Circuit refused to apply
§ 2254(d)(1) where the habeas petitioner raised a federal constitutional claim, but
the state court resolved the issue against him on the basis of Massachusetts
evidentiary law. The clear application of state law to a federal claim cannot be
equated with a summary or cursory dismissal of a federal claim. In the latter case, a
federal court must make some assumption, absent evidence one way or the other,
about whether the state court tacitly applied governing federal law. It is therefore
not clear that the First Circuit has affirmatively decided that a cursory dismissal
does not merit AEDPA review. Cf. McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
The McCambridge court stated:
If there is a federal or state case that explicitly says that the state adheres
to a standard that is more favorable to defendants than the federal
standard (and it is correct in its characterization of the law), we will
presume the federal law adjudication to be subsumed within the state law
adjudication.
Id. at 35. But see Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2003) (characterizing
the First Circuit's views, and the Third Circuit's holding in Hameen, as applicable to
cursory decisions that "fail[] to even mention" the federal claim altogether).
126 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. In Chadwick v. Janecka, 312
F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit suggested that the Supreme Court has
implicitly approved this construction, see id. at 606, because Weeks v. Angelone, 528
U.S. 225 (2000), affirmed the Fourth Circuit's treatment of a summary dismissal of
one of forty-seven assignments of error presented to the Virginia Supreme Court.
Weeks did not address the issue, however, and the Court, after finding the
petitioner's claims without merit, merely said in dicta that "it follows a fortiori that
the adjudication of the Supreme Court of Virginia affirming petitioner's conviction
and sentence neither was 'contrary to,' nor involved an 'unreasonable application of,'
any of our decisions." Weeks, 528 U.S. at 237.
127 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite
to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable
application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
128
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
No fewer than six-and possibly all-of the justices in
Williams implied that to determine which § 2254(d)(1) clause to
apply, and then to apply the clause so identified, requires
analysis of the state court's decision. Because this process
"cannot be performed if the state court decision does not identify
in some fashion the legal rule through which the result was
reached," an 'adjudication' only takes place when the state court
decision makes its rationale (the legal rule it applied) at least
minimally apparent."1 29 That does not mean a state court must
use particular language. It must, however, either (1) cite or
apply federal law, (2) cite or apply state law that in turn cites or
applies federal law, or at a minimum, (3) otherwise manifest its
fidelity to or application of the correct rule prescribed by federal
law. 130 Note that the third of these possibilities does not exclude
the possibility of an adjudication by a cursory state-court
decision, provided the state court's decision, the object of a
federal court's review under § 2254(d), is manifestly correct; but
in that event, it hardly matters whether the decision is reviewed
under § 2254(d)(1) or de novo.
Like the construction adopted in Sellan, this alternative
reading may be thought to possess several virtues. First, it
enables or facilitates the Williams analysis. Second, it promotes
Congress's intent to reduce delay in the resolution of federal
128

Id. at 412-13.

129 Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 255 F.3d
45 (2d Cir. 2001). This is not strictly accurate: A cursory state court opinion that
denies relief under circumstances where Supreme Court precedent clearly requires
it would be either "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of' that precedent.
Hence, at times, the process mandated by § 2254(d)(1) can be performed even where
a state court does not make the legal rule it applied minimally apparent. In effect,
in such cases it is the state court's failure to apply the right legal rule that is, not
just minimally, but glaringly apparent.
130 See Washington, 240 F.3d at 108 n.4.
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habeas petitions by "obviat[ing] the need for the sometimes
complicated analysis that arises when a federal habeas court
cannot determine whether a state court decided a claim on
substantive or procedural grounds." 131 Third, it furthers the
values of comity because it diminishes the risk that a federal
court will misconstrue the basis on which a state court decided a
federal claim and then find that (misconstrued) decision to be
unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law, 132 a
message that hardly furthers the mutual respect among the
federal and state judiciaries that lies at the foundation of comity.
Finally, under an equally plausible reading of the text, which,
consistent with a well-established principle of statutory
construction, 133 would give distinct meanings to the words
"judgment," "decision," and "adjudication," all of which appear in
§ 2254(d), it would respect "Congress's admonition that AEDPA's
deferent standards of review only apply 'with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings."' 134
C. PotentialAmbiguities and Intermediate Positions
In both Washington and Sellan, the Second Circuit
suggested that the Third Circuit, in Hameen v. Delaware, had
adopted this alternative construction, thus giving rise to a circuit
split.135 In Hameen, the Third Circuit found that even though
the state court relied on Gregg v. Georgia 36 to reject a habeas
petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim, because Gregg had not
been addressed to the specific question raised by that claim, the
state court had not adjudicated that question on the merits.
Judge Greenberg explained that:

131 Washington, 255 F.3d at 54.
132 See id. (citing Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999)).
133 See, e.g., Williams, 529 U.S. at 404 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("It
is ... a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.") (quotation marks omitted); see also
id. at 405 ("The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly accorded both the
'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses independent meaning.")

(emphasis added).
134 Washington, 240 F.3d at 108, 110 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
135 See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Hameen
v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000)); Washington, 255 F.3d at 53 (same).
136 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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[N]otwithstanding the Delaware court's reliance on Gregg....
it did not pass on [the habeas petitioner's] Eighth Amendment
constitutional
duplicative
aggravating
circumstances
argument, even though it had the opportunity to do so.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the Delaware Supreme Court
took into account controlling Supreme Court decisions. This
point is critical because under the AEDPA the limitation on the
granting of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is only
"with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings." Hence we exercise pre-AEDPA
independent judgment on the duplicative aggravating
137
circumstances claim.

Subsequently, however, the Third Circuit distinguished
Hameen and two subsequent cases that apparently applied the
same rule.
It remarked that those cases "stand for the
proposition that, if an examination of the opinions of the state
court shows that they misunderstood the nature of a properly
exhausted claim and thus failed to adjudicate that claim on the
merits, the deferential standards of review in AEDPA do not
apply."'138 Equally, a number of circuits distinguish between the
application of § 2254(d) to cursory dispositions, on the one hand,
and to no disposition at all, on the other-although it remains
unclear whether a plausible analytic method can meaningfully
draw this distinction in a uniform manner. 13 9
The same
distinction (or ambiguity) may be discerned in the opinions of
other circuits. 140
Some commentators have also identified
certain intermediate positions in the decisions of some circuits
and drawn more refined distinctions that lie in the middle of the
spectrum between the two positions staked out in Washington.4 1

137

Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000).

138

Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 2002).

139

See Schoenberger v. Russell, 290 F.3d 831, 838-39 (6th Cir. 2002) (Keith, J.,

concurring).
140 See generally DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); LaFevers v.
Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that where it is apparent that
the state court failed to adjudicate a federal claim even summarily, that claim has
not been "adjudicated on the merits," and § 2254(d)(1) does not apply); Mercadel v.
Cain, 179 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999).
141 See Glidden, supra note 27, at 193-95 (describing the "intermediate
deference" employed by some circuits); Welty, supra note 27, at 914-22 (surveying
and categorizing the approaches of the federal circuits differently); Wilner, supra
note 27, at 1461-72 (ascribing distinct positions to the First, Third, and Tenth
Circuits (no deference), the Fourth Circuit (total deference), the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits (varying levels of deference depending on whether the state court
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None of these positions, however, challenge Sellan's foundational
logic.
D.

Conclusion

Where a state petitioner's claim arguably has merit, the
practical difference between the predominant view and the
alternative articulated in Washington is non-trivial. Under the
predominant standard, a federal claim does not, strictly
speaking, receive federal scrutiny; only the state court's decision,
the result of a tacit or hypothetical adjudication, receives federal
scrutiny-and then only under the tortuous standard of review
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as interpreted by a
plurality in Williams. Under the alternative view, a federal
claim not addressed by the state court, whether constitutional,
statutory, or treaty-based, 142 receives de novo review, at least as
to issues of law. This, as both pluralities in Williams agreed,
had been the clear rule before AEDPA. 14 3 The construction of
§ 2254(d) applicable to summary dismissals of federal claims by
state courts therefore may well be outcome-determinative in
''144
"hard cases.
III. CONSTRUING § 2254(d): TEXTUALISM, FIDELITY TO THE
CORPUS JURIS, AND POLICY

A.

Textualism

The predominant construction of § 2254(d)'s "adjudicated on
the merits" requirement purports to be grounded in, if not
addressed a federal issue in state law terms or not at all), and the Second and Ninth
Circuits (intermediate deference)).
142 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000) (authorizing federal courts to grant the writ to a
petitioner "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States").
143 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 378, 383-84 (2000) (Opinion of
Stevens, J.) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)); id. at 402 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.).
144 See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
because the petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim "is quite strong," and
therefore, that "were we to review [the petitioner's] Sixth Amendment claim de
novo, we might well be inclined to grant the writ"). By "hard cases," I have in mind
Ronald Dworkin's denomination of cases in which no manifest rule on which all
reasonable jurists would agree clearly resolves the issue raised one way or another.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

81

(1977).

2004]

"ADJUDICATIONON THE MERITS"

645

dictated by, the plain meaning of the statutory text. 145 This is
misleading. The text has no plain meaning. To reach the
construction adopted by most circuits, certain canons of
statutory interpretation must be invoked, for example, that
"[w]hen Congress uses a term of art ...we presume that it
speaks consistently with the commonly understood meaning of
the term;"' 46 others must be ignored, for example, that we must
147
"give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."
Llewellyn famously pointed out that different canons of statutory
construction can be invoked to justify different interpretive
148 It
processes, culminating, at times, in contrary conclusions.
could therefore easily have been emphasized, as indeed a
different panel of the Second Circuit did in the withdrawn
Washington v. Schriver decision, that because § 2254(d) refers to
a "judgment," an "adjudicat[ion]," and a "decision," federal courts
should not lightly treat these words synonymously.1 49 The
Sellan interpretation of § 2254(d) does that. It fails to give
independent meaning to the word "adjudicated," because it
equates "adjudicated on the merits" with "decided on the merits,"
thereby reading out of the statutory provision the condition
precedent to the application of § 2254(d)(1).
Another plain
reading of § 2254(d) could, with equal plausibility, yield the
contrary conclusion-that "[a]n adjudication is not itself a
decision. A decision is the result of an adjudication.
An
adjudication, accordingly, is something more than a disposition
that concludes judicial consideration of a claim. It is a decision50
making process for reachinga dispositive judgment."'
The sequence of the text of § 2241(d) also strongly suggests
that a federal habeas court should first determine whether a
state court did adjudicate a federal claim "on the merits," and
only upon reaching an affirmative conclusion to that question,
145 See, e.g., Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254-55 (11th Cir.
2002); Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312; Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000);
Aycox v. Little, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999).
146Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311.
147 Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882).
148 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395 (1950).
149 Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 255
F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001).
150 YACKLE, supra note 35, at 557 n.378; see also Yackle, supra note 11, at 420
nn.128-30.
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address whether the state court's adjudication "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States."'15 1 In Sellan, by
contrast, the Second Circuit began with the "threshold" inquiry
whether the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
stated a violation of "clearly established Federal law."'152 This
seems to be incorrect, as it imports AEDPA's newfangled
standard of review into the context of habeas review of state
court convictions that do not meet the conditions precedent to
the application of § 2254(d).
But the problem with the predominant textual construction
runs deeper.
In Sellan, the Second Circuit said that
.'[a]djudicated on the merits' has a well-settled meaning: a
decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata
effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced,
rather than on a procedural, or other, ground."'153
Recall,
however, that general principles of preclusion, including res
judicata, have never applied in the ordinary course in the habeas
context. It would therefore seem, at the very least, incongruous
to import into the habeas context a principle of preclusion that,
as a matter of both history and precedent, had theretofore been
out of place. It should not be assumed, without evidence, that
Congress intended to interpose radical changes to the concept of
habeas corpus. To the contrary, despite the perceived radical
changes wrought by AEDPA, the statute "takes the preexisting
habeas landscape as its baseline."'154 The Supreme Court
repeatedly has emphasized that ambiguous statutes must be
construed "to contain that permissible meaning which fits most
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and
subsequently enacted law [and thus] to make sense rather than
nonsense of the corpus juris."'55 The text of § 2254(d) therefore
does not admit of a single "plain meaning." Its meaning depends
in the first instance on which canons of statutory construction a
court elects to apply and which to ignore. The canon invoked in
151

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).

152 Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2001).

153 Id. at 311.
154 Yackle, supra note 11, at 381; see also id. at 398 ("By its explicit terms,
§ 2254(d) presupposes the basic habeas jurisdiction established by the 1867 Act,
now codified in § 2241 and reaffirmed in § 2254(a).").
155 W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991).
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support of the predominant construction-that Congress must be
presumed to speak consistently-seems questionable in the
context of habeas corpus, for the res judicata meaning of
"adjudicated
on
the
merits"
has,
historically
and
jurisprudentially, not applied on habeas.
Because the text of § 2254(d) is ambiguous, courts must look
elsewhere to inform its meaning. To be sure, as many circuits
have observed, nothing in this provision requires federal courts
56
to appraise the reasoning process of a state court.1
Independent federal judgment under § 2254(d)(1) is brought to
bear on the result of an adjudication rather than the analytic
processes of the adjudication. But this confuses matters. The
preceding observation applies to a § 2254(d)(1) analysis. In that
context, a court must appraise the merits of the petitioner's
claim under the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application"
clauses by reference to the result reached, not by scrutiny of the
state court's analysis.
The question under consideration,
however, is whether § 2254(d)(1) should apply at all in the
absence of at least some indicia of an adjudication of the federal
question. To decide that question by invoking the results-notreasoning mantra is circular. It assumes the fact in question:
that the federal court has already determined that the state
court did adjudicate the petitioner's federal claim on the merits.
B.

Fidelity to the Corpus Juris

To construe § 2254(d) properly requires that ambiguities be
resolved in a manner that "fits most logically and comfortably
into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law
[and thus] make[s] sense rather than nonsense of the corpus
juris."157 To repeat, habeas corpus is emphatically not, in its
origins or nature, an appeal. Judicial constructions of AEDPA's
habeas provisions should respect this distinction. Consistent
with the Supreme Court's general approach, we need not assume
any particular theory about the original meaning of the
Suspension Clause. It suffices to appreciate that the Clause
should inform the construction of an ambiguous habeas statute
and that the canon of constitutional doubt counsels against a

156 E.g., Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 159-60 (4th Cir. 2000); Aycox v. Lytle, 196
F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999).
157 Casey, 499 U.S. at 100-01.
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restrictive construction that could raise Suspension Clause
concerns. Also, after the Civil War Amendments' reorientation
of federal and state power, the further nationalization of power
in the wake of the New Deal, and the expansion of the scope of
constitutional rights and liberties, particularly in criminal
procedure, associated with the heyday of the Warren Court, the
vital role of habeas corpus as the Great Writ of Liberty today
falls squarely within the province of the federal judiciary. An
"originalist" interpretation of the Suspension Clause, then, far
from respecting the elusive intention of the Framers, may well
damage that intention:
to enshrine a bulwark against
encroachments upon personal liberty by the political branches of
the federal government. 158 Recall that the Clause is located in
Article I, section 9, of the Constitution, which enumerates limits
on congressional power. Deference to "congressional intent" in
this context, as the presumed will of the majority, may thus be
misguided-assuming it can be discerned, which is doubtful. 159
Habeas corpus, as a legal device, also should not be analyzed
in isolation from the political system in which it operates. The
Constitution, as we know, does not establish a simple system of
democracy as mere majoritarian rule. Its structure seeks to
158 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)
("Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment, is
written into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot in my judgment be
constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.").
159 Tellingly, both proponents of the predominant view of "adjudicated on the
merits" and those who would prefer an alternative reading tend to invoke two pieces
of legislative history. First, Senator Hatch's statement that AEDPA would "simply
end[] the improper review of State court decisions. After all, State courts are
required to uphold the Constitution and to faithfully apply Federal laws. There is
simply no reason that Federal courts should have the ability to virtually retry cases
that have been properly adjudicated by our State courts," 142 CONG. REC. S3446-47
(1996). Senator Hyde discussed how, by deferring to "State courts' legal decisions if
they are not contrary to established Supreme Court precedent," the judicial system
would "avoid relitigating endlessly the same issues"). 142 CONG. REc. H2247, 2249
(1996). Compare Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 314 (2d Cir. 2001), with
Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(invoking Senator Hatch's statement in support of differing conclusions). The reason
is that these statements presume rather than explain an "adjudication on the
merits" by the state courts. They simply do not inform the question whether a silent
or cursory state-court decision should be considered an "adjudication on the merits"
such that to conduct federal habeas review would be to "virtually retry cases that
have been properly adjudicated by our State courts." Senator Hatch's statement,
that is, begs the question what it means for a case to have been "properly
adjudicated." Equally, Senator Hyde's remarks presume that federal habeas review
would involve "relitigation," which of course presupposes an initial litigation.
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protect individuals against the "tyranny of the majority"
threatened by unmitigated majoritarian rule, against which
John Stuart Mill famously warned. 160 Habeas corpus is one of
the devices that safeguards individuals against that tyranny, as
its jurisprudential evolution attests. 161 As a judicial device to
test the legality of convictions, it has historically held an
esteemed place in the arsenal of political and legal mechanisms
by which majoritarian and autocratic abuses have been averted
in Anglo-American legal systems. 162 In England, "a steady
stream of legislation restricting the scope of habeas corpus," and
subsequently, abuses by the Star Chamber and other executive
acts, culminated in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.163 In the
justly celebrated Bushell's Case, for example, the petitioner, one
of the jurors who refused to convict William Penn for assembly
and speech allegedly subversive of the doctrines of the
established Anglican Church, successfully invoked the writ to
challenge his detention. 164 Chief Justice Vaughan extolled the
writ as "the most usual remedy by which a man is restored again
to his liberty, if he have been against law deprived of it."165 In
the United States, federal habeas corpus served as the device to
test the legality of congressional and state action in the
aftermath of the Civil War. 166 And the evolution of the modern
writ in the twentieth century-particularly its development in
response to mob-dominated trials and other due process
violations-likewise attests to its role in countering majoritarian
167
abuses.
160 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 4
161 See Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus:

HUM. RTS. 375, 402-34 (1998).

(Elizabeth Rapaport ed. 1978) (1859).
The HistoricalDebate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.

Id. at 380.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 37, at 57.
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006-07 (C.P. 1670); see DUKER, supra note
36, at 53-54.
165 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1007.
166 See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (challenging
the Military Reconstruction Act after arrest for the publication of editorials critical
of congressionally imposed martial law in the South); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 85, 94-95 (1868).
167 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it is of
course no coincidence that habeas corpus has been the principal mechanism by
which individuals and proponents of civil liberties have sought to challenge the
legality of executive detention imposed in the name of the 'War on Terrorism." See,
e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
162
163
164
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That said, were Congress, the majoritarian branch of the
federal government, to enact a provision unambiguously
foreclosing habeas review in certain circumstances, federal
courts would be required either to abide by that mandate or,
declare it
depending
on its substance and details,
But it has not; the text of § 2254(d) is
unconstitutional.
ambiguous. For this reason, it should be construed, to the extent
consistent with its text, to conform to the venerable corpus juris
of the writ. The twin principles embodied in this jurisprudence
relevant to the question under consideration are, first, that
habeas corpus is not an appeal, and second, that it has
traditionally served as a sui generis judicial device for the
vindication of personal liberty and, in the United States, the
To define
constitutional rights that protect that liberty.
"[a]djudicated on the merits" to mean no more than "a decision
finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that
is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on
a procedural, or other, ground,"' 168 inadequately considers both
principles. Res judicata, full faith and credit, and similar
principles have never applied in the ordinary course in the
context of habeas corpus. By permitting an opaque decision
"resolving" a prisoner's federal constitutional claims to limit
federal habeas review of the legality of his or her detention, the
predominant interpretation tends to deny persons, not
"relitigation" of paramount constitutional issues adjudicated by a
state court, but any meaningful habeas consideration of those
issues at all. These observations, I believe, militate in favor of
an alternative interpretation of "adjudicated on the merits" that
would authorize AEDPA's standard of review only in cases in
which some manifestation of a prior state-court adjudication can
be found. This alternative, upon analysis, would also further,
rather than hinder, the values of comity, federalism, and judicial
efficiency, the policy objectives that proponents of the
predominant construction tend to invoke in support of their
position.

168 Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Semtek Int'l,
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-02 (2001)).
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C. Some Thoughts on Comity, JudicialEfficiency, and
Federalism
The federal circuit courts typically resolve the construction
of § 2254(d) by reference to the alleged plain meaning of its text.
Almost as an afterthought, they say that this construction more
effectively furthers the objectives of AEDPA's habeas provisions.
Those objectives fall into three broad categories: comity, judicial
efficiency, and federalism. To facilitate their consideration, it
will be useful to distinguish four postures in which a federal
habeas court may find itself where a person in state custody
pursuant to a state court judgment raises a federal claim: (1)
the state court correctly perceives the federal issue and
manifestly decides it, correctly or not, on the merits; (2) the state
or
court's view, misperceives
in the federal
court,
misunderstands the federal issue but manifestly decides that
misconceived issue on the merits; (3) the state court fails to
perceive the federal issue at all; and (4) the state court perceives
the federal question but finds it frivolous or otherwise so
meritless that the court declines to address it expressly. In each
of these scenarios, § 2254(d) requires the federal habeas court to
determine as a threshold matter whether the state court decision
on the federal claim in fact "resulted" from an "adjudication on
the merits."
In the first scenario, the federal habeas court's role is clear.
It must examine the decision that resulted from the state court's
adjudication and decide whether that decision is "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
[f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States."' 6 9 The court must, as a formal matter, appraise the
result of the state court's adjudication rather than its reasoning.
But as many federal circuit courts have observed, some
manifestation of the court's adjudicatory process-whether by
citing or applying federal law, or citing or applying state law
that, in turn, cites federal law-greatly facilitates the federal
habeas court's task.' 70 It reduces the risk that the federal court
will misunderstand the basis of the state court's decision and
then find it "unreasonable" or "contrary to ... clearly established
169 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
170 See, e.g., Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311; Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 n.3
(10th Cir. 1999).
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Federal law" on that mistaken basis. Still, because habeas
corpus is not an appeal-because its purpose is emphatically not
to correct technical errors but to secure the freedom from
unlawful confinement by providing a vehicle to challenge the
legal basis for detention-if the state court reached the right
result by an incorrect adjudication, it makes sense that a federal
habeas court lacks authority to issue the writ. Equally, in the
second scenario, while the federal habeas court may well note its
disagreement with the state court's perception or analysis of a
federal issue, because a manifest "adjudication on the merits"
has been conducted, the question, in the final analysis, remains
whether the decision of the state court nonetheless forecloses
habeas relief because, even though based on an incorrect
adjudication, the decision itself is neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of "clearly established [flederal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The
statute, in short, regulates relief rather than jurisdiction.
Now consider the latter two scenarios. In practice, they will
be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish. In both cases the
state court will have dismissed outstanding claims, including
any federal claims not apparent from the face of the opinion, as
"without merit" or by some similar cursory disposition. 171 For
that reason, whether AEDPA's regulation of habeas relief
controls will be recondite. A federal habeas court must adopt
some method to determine whether the state court (tacitly)
"adjudicated" any (recondite) federal claims "on the merits."
Three potential approaches exist: First, the court could adopt a
presumption against an "adjudication on the merits" and
therefore review the federal claims under the pre-AEDPA, de
novo, standard. Second, it could adopt a presumption in favor of
an "adjudication on the merits" and therefore apply § 2254(d)(1)

171 If the petitioner's submissions in state court fail to raise the federal issue or
"fairly present" it, then the issue will be either procedurally defaulted or
unexhausted. In that event, different considerations apply. See Cox v. Miller, 296
F.3d 89, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Fluellen v. Walker, 41 Fed. Appx. 497, 500
n. 1 (2d Cir. 2002). In Fluellen, the court observed unacknowledged tension between
the Second Circuit's decision in Sellan and dicta in Rudenko V.Costello, 286 F.3d 51,
71 (2d Cir. 2002), withdrawn on other grounds, 322 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2003), insofar
as Rudenko said that where a state appellate court "reject[s] in bulk undiscussedand perhaps unlisted--claims by stating that they [a]re 'either' meritless 'or'
procedurally barred ...no AEDPA deference by the district court on these claims
[i]s warranted." Id.
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regardless of the state-court decision's manifestation vel non of
an "adjudication on the merits." Third, it could adopt some test
or analytic method by which to try to ascertain whether, even
though no adjudication on the merits appears from the face of
the opinion, the state court more likely than not did adjudicate
the federal claim or claims at issue on the merits. The second of
these approaches would read the "adjudicated on the merits"
condition entirely out of the statute. That would be untenable,
both as a matter of statutory construction and fidelity to the
purpose of federal habeas corpus review of state judgments of
conviction, to test the legality of the basis for confinement. Most
federal circuits have therefore adopted the third approach.
In Mercadel v. Cain,172 for example, the Fifth Circuit
articulated a test for determining whether a state-court decision
that does not mention a federal claim nonetheless "adjudicated"
that claim "on the merits":
[W]e determine whether a state court's disposition of a
petitioner's claim is on the merits by considering:
(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2)
whether the history of the case suggests that the state court
was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the
merits; and (3) whether the state courts' opinions suggest
reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination
173
on the merits.
The Second Circuit adopted this test verbatim in Sellan v.
Kuhlman.174 Considered in light of the comity and judicial
efficiency concerns that purportedly animated this oft-laborious
investigation, the Mercadel test raises some curious questions.
First, it is far from clear that this method will produce an
accurate result. Why should what one state court did, at one
time, on the basis of one particular set of facts, be a good
indicium of what another state court did, at another time, on the
basis of a different set of facts? The state judiciary is not a
monolith. Different judges engage different issues differently.
Some will give short shrift to a federal issue even though their
colleagues, in another case, would consider the same issue in
depth. Mercadel would require federal courts to divine, in the

173

179 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 274.

174

261 F.3d at 314.

172
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absence of direct evidence, what a state appellate-court panel
thought when it ruled on a particular criminal appeal. It strains
credulity that an analysis of prior state-law cases will disclose
whether the panel's boilerplate dismissal "either unpreserved for
appellate review or without merit" means that it did or did not
175
adjudicate a certain conceivable federal claim "on the merits."
Second, and from the standpoint of judicial efficiency, more
critically, it should come as no surprise that federal courts
seldom actually engage in the Mercadel analysis. It takes time
that would be far better spent simply analyzing the substantive
merits of the federal claim. Typically, federal courts therefore
elide the issue, saying that they need not decide whether the
state court adjudicated the federal claim on the merits because
resolution of the issue would be the same whether analyzed
under § 2254(d)(1) or de novo. 176 This makes sense. Why should
a federal court waste judicial time and resources delving into a
voluminous corpus of state-court decisions on constitutional
criminal procedure if the federal claim at issue manifestly fails
on the merits?
Third, the assumption that comity demands the Mercadel or
some similar analysis bears reconsideration. Most federal courts
have held that where a state court manifestly misperceives the
federal issue, the actual federal issue has not been adjudicated
on the merits for purposes of § 2254(d)(1). 177 If misperception of
a federal question calls for pre-AEDPA review on the
unadjudicated claim, why should failure to perceive the existence
of a federal question at all merit AEDPA review? Of course,
when a state court summarily dismisses remaining claims,
federal or not, as "without merit," we do not know whether it
failed to perceive a federal question or perceived the question but
found it so frivolous or meritless as to be unworthy of discussion.
But in either case, a compelling rationale for pre-AEDPA (de
novo) review exists:
If the state court genuinely failed to
175 Concededly, if the "history of the case" (for example, the state-court
appellate briefs of the parties) provides genuine insight into what federal issues
were raised, the Mercadel analysis may be both more plausible and more efficient.
See Mercadel, 179 F.3d at 274.
176 E.g., Cox, 296 F.3d at 101.
177 Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 2002); Hameen v.
Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000); see also DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1,
6-7 (1st Cir. 2001); LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999);
Mercadel, 179 F.3d at 275-76.
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perceive the federal issue, then it should be reviewed de novo,
because, first, if misperception calls for pre-AEDPA review, a
fortiori does non-perception; 178 and second, failure to perceive the
federal issue cannot plausibly be equated with an adjudication
on the merits of that issue. By contrast, if the state court did
perceive the federal issue, but found it unworthy of comment,
then the rationale for applying § 2254(d)(1)'s tortuous standard
of review is weak. Either the federal issue is, in fact, meritless,
in which case a federal court can, equally and far more
efficiently, simply reaffirm that appraisal without being
compelled to engage in the convoluted epistemic analysis
articulated in Mercadel; or it is not, in which case we should
reconsider why and how comity should apply here.
In this regard courts frequently cite Senator Hatch's
statement that AEDPA
[s]imply ends the improper review of State court decisions.
After all, State courts are required to uphold the Constitution
and to faithfully apply Federal laws. There is simply no reason
that Federal courts should have the ability to virtually retry
cases that have been properly adjudicated by our State
courts.179

Representative Hyde remarked to similar effect that
AEDPA's standard of review ensures that the courts will "avoid
relitigating endlessly the same issues."'80 But if a federal issue
is not meritless, and the state court did not address it at all, then
it is far from clear that a federal court shows comity to a state
court by imputing, per Mercadel or by some similar method, a
variety of hypothetical analytic processes to that court, by which

178 Because Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989), already delimits the
scope of habeas to clearly established rules of federal law, it makes little sense to
construe § 2254(d)(1) to further constrain the scope of review to cases in which the
state court did not even acknowledge, still less apply, those clearly established laws.
Before AEDPA, a federal district court could not grant the writ simply because it
would have construed a federal claim differently, provided that the issue could be
characterized as 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."' Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992) (quoting Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)).
After AEDPA, the Sellan construction of § 2254(d) would, according to some views,
require an interpretation of federal law 'so far off the mark as to suggest judicial
incompetence"' or a lack of integrity. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.
2000) (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (en
banc)).
179 142 CONG. REC. S3446-47 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
180 142 CONG. REC. H2247-49 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
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it presumably arrived at the result being reviewed, and then, if
the federal court disagrees with that result, being required, per
Williams, to label it either 'contrary to"' or .'involv[ing] an
unreasonable application of . .. clearly established Federal
law."' 181 That judgment may imply incompetence at best; a lack
of integrity or fairness at worst. Yet that is what the Mercadel
analysis would compel a federal court to say in order to issue the
writ where federal law, in the federal court's view, requires it,
and the state court's decision failed to mention the meritorious
federal issue. To say that the state court erred, as all courts do
at times, by failing to perceive, for example, an important federal
issue raised or implied but perhaps not well briefed by the
parties, shows more respect for the state court than to impute to
it an "unreasonable" analytic process.
To require state courts to disclose some manifestation of an
adjudication of federal issues therefore would further, not
impede, the values of comity and judicial efficiency. If the state
court never mentioned the federal claim at all, and it turns out
to be meritorious, it is difficult to see how this constitutes
"relitigat[ion]," in Representative Hyde's words, or the
inappropriate power "virtually [to] retry cases that have been
18 2
properly adjudicated by our State courts," in Senator Hatch's.
The rationale of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is that where a state court
already has analyzed a federal issue, it may be appropriate, as a
matter of comity, and efficient, as a matter of avoiding
duplicative judicial analysis, to defer to the result of that
analysis. But if the state court simply says that remaining
claims, including whatever federal claims the petitioner may
have raised, are either unpreserved for appellate review or
without merit, extending deference to the state court's analysis
serves neither of these purposes. It is also not clear that
redundant consideration of federal issues is an evil to be avoided.
Cover and Aleinkoff, for example, have argued forcefully that
181 529 U.S.

362, 403-13

(2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(i)

(1994))

(emphasis omitted).
182 141 CONG. REc. S3446-02, 3447 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Cf.
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9 (1995) ("It is fundamental that state courts be left

free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally
important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as
barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal
constitution of state action.") (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,
557 (1940)).
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this redundancy, and the attendant dialogue between federal
and state courts, constitutes a principal value of the dialectical
federalism created by federal habeas review of state court
183
judgments.
Comity is based on the presumption of parity: that state
judges, equally with their federal counterparts, can and will fully
The rationale for
and fairly adjudicate federal questions.
if the state court
dissolves
§
2244(d)(1)
under
deference
AEDPA
either elects not to reach a federal question or neglects to apply
federal law. A federal court does not show a lack of respect for a
state court by passing on a question the state court did not
adjudicate; to the contrary, as emphasized, it may well evince
disrespect by imputing some hypothetical analytic process to the
state court and then classifying the result of that process as
unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law in
order to be able to grant habeas relief in appropriate
State defendants will only be inclined to
circumstances.
"sandbag," as the Sellan court suggested,1 8 4 if parity is indeed a
"myth."18 5
Sellan denies that, as do the statements of
Representative Hyde and Senator Hatch.1 8 6 To encourage the
reality rather than the mere presumption of parity, the judicial
construction of an ambiguous statutory provision should, to the
greatest extent consistent with its text, hold state courts to the
obligation, "equally with the courts of the Union ....to guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States."'1 7 To paraphrase Justice
Brennan, "[t]he state judiciaries, responsible equally with the
federal courts to secure [federal] rights, should be encouraged to
vindicate them. A self-fashioned abdication by the federal courts
of their habeas corpus jurisdiction in cases where state prisoners
are denied state relief [in the absence of any articulation or

183
184
185

See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 77.
Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 313-14 (2d Cir. 2001).
See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105

(1977).
186 See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 314; 142 CONG. REC. S3446-47 (1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch); 142 CONG. REC. H2247-49 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
187 Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 8 (1995) ("State courts, in appropriate cases, are not merely free to-they are
bound to-interpret the United States Constitution.").
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mention of the governing federal law] would not provide that
'18 8
encouragement."
This is not to suggest that state judges must use particular
language. It is only to say that if they do not, they will not enjoy
the presumption that the decision has been "adjudicated on the
merits," and hence § 2241(d)(1)'s curious standard of review will
not apply to the result of that adjudication. Were federal courts
to require some manifestation of an adjudication before applying
§ 2254(d)(1), this would, at once, encourage state courts to
undertake the constitutional review required of them by the
Supremacy Clause, and at the same time save federal judicial
resources by avoiding the needless Mercadel-type analyses
necessitated by the predominant Sellan view. In short, to say
that federal claims are either unpreserved or without merit is, at
least in meritorious cases, to displace work onto federal courts
that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to perform.
And in non-meritorious cases, the application of § 2254(d)(1) will
make little difference. Federal courts will find it easier and more
efficient to reach and resolve the merits than to engage in the
prolonged process of, first, conducting the tortuous epistemic
investigation demanded by Mercadel to divine whether the state
court adjudicated a given issue on the merits; and second,
deciding whether that tacitly or hypothetically adjudicated claim
passes muster under the equally tortuous § 2254(d)(1) standard
89
of review, as interpreted by a plurality in Williams v. Taylor.1
It may be objected that the requirement of "some
manifestation" is an empty formalism: State courts may simply
be encouraged to add the word "federal," or to cite a federal case
or two, before inserting the boilerplate phrase disposing of
remaining claims as without merit. The point, however, is not to
demand such empty formalisms, and state courts need not and, I
believe, will not waste time analyzing manifestly frivolous claims
or ensuring that their opinions bear the formalistic hallmarks of
an adjudication simply in order to receive more deferential
habeas review. Again, if the claims are frivolous, then how the
state courts dispose of them-whether by a manifest
adjudication on the merits or by a cursory disposition-will be
inconsequential.
Federal courts can, equally and far more

188 Brennan, supra note 78, at 442.
189 529 U.S. 362, 385-86 (2000).
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efficiently, simply reaffirm that appraisal under a de novo
standard: If the claim fails under a de novo standard, a fortiori
it fails under § 2254(d)(1). But in hard cases, the law should not
enable state courts to shield their decisions from scrutiny by
declining to engage in a manifest analysis of properly presented
federal constitutional claims. It is precisely in such cases that
state courts should, so to speak, "show their work." That work,
the state court's analysis, supplies the justification under
AEDPA for mandating that a federal habeas court defer, to some
degree, to the result of the state court's adjudication, for "[i]n
this way, the federal court takes serious account (but not
controlling account) of the best available thinking on the claim at
bar-the prior adjudication of that claim in state court." 190 By
contrast, if a state court declines manifestly to adjudicate a
federal claim, then no "best available thinking on the claim at
bar" exists. It makes little sense to circumscribe a federal court's
ability to analyze a federal question based on the absence of a
state court analysis. That could, in effect, discourage state
courts from analyzing difficult federal questions precisely in
those situations in which their analyses would be most valuable,
while needlessly limiting the authority of federal courts to
contribute to federal constitutional jurisprudence.
The question of federalism's bearing, if any, on the
construction of § 2254(d) remains. Notwithstanding the "new
federalism" and its exhortation in recent political and legal
rhetoric, 191 federalism is not an independent value or end in
itself; it is a means to a number of political and legal objectives,
two of which dominate the discourse. First, by dispersing power
between the federal and state governments, federalism helps to
prevent the aggrandizement of power in any one seat of
government. Second, by enabling diverse systems of law and
190 Yackle, supra note 11, at 383; accord Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278
F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002); Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (observing that the
statutory text of § 2254(d) focuses on the result rather than the reasoning process of
the state court).
191 In general, the "new federalism" identifies trends in Supreme Court
jurisprudence that empower the states or reinvigorate a robust conception of states'
rights, often at the expense of federal (and particularly congressional) authority.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Marci A. Hamilton, Nine
Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 931 (2001); Mark Tushnet,
What is the Supreme Court's New Federalism?,25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 927 (2000).
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policy to subsist within a common national polity, it permits
constructive experimentation. In Justice Brandeis's well-known
dictum: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." 192 In the habeas context,
however, this latter value has no place. States can, of course,
implement different systems of criminal procedure, and
experimentation in this regard may well be valuable. But while
state procedural rules that promote efficiency or finality, for
example, therefore merit deference under prevailing Supreme
Court precedent, 193 constitutional and federal law delimit the
scope of experimentation on matters of substance, i.e., "the
merits." Justice Stevens is undoubtedly correct that § 2254(d)(1)
does not, and constitutionally cannot, require deference to state
decisions in the sense that "the Constitution means one thing in
194
Wisconsin and another in Indiana."'
Federal habeas corpus therefore must remain capable of
performing its paramount function-to vindicate the right to
personal liberty where violations of federal and constitutional
rights have led to an unlawful confinement pursuant to a statecourt judgment-despite variations in state laws and the
composition or quality of state judiciaries.
"We prize our
federalism," Justice Brennan wrote, "because of the proved
contributions of our federal structure towards securing
individual liberty."'195 The construction of § 2254(d) should be

192 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). But see Edward L.
Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that this value inheres in decentralization, not
federalism per se).
193 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
194 Williams, 529 U.S. at 387 n.13 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). What it does appear to mean, however, is that a federal court's authority
to grant habeas relief on the same federal claim may differ depending on the nature
of the state court's decision.
195 Brennan, supra note 78, at 442; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 351

(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 577

(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (extolling the writ of habeas corpus
as a principal bulwark of personal liberty that the Constitution would ensure even
in the absence of a bill of rights).
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informed by this substantive objective of federalism, not by the
196
mere invocation of its name or the mantra of states' rights.
CONCLUSION

In her 1994 James Madison Lecture at New York University
School of Law, Judge Betty B. Fletcher observed that in the
context of capital punishment, habeas jurisprudence tends to
waste an extraordinary amount of judicial resources, while
simultaneously hindering, rather than enabling or facilitating,
the ability of a federal habeas court to perform its mandate:
To the rational mind, it is surely apparent that the system has
it backward. The intense effort and resources are concentrated
at the wrong end. We have inadequate representation at the
trial level, which erodes the capacity of judges and juries to
acquit the innocent and to save from death those who deserve
less punishment; we have prolonged review processes that more
often than not deflect attention from the real issues of fair trial
and possible innocence to arcane examination of technical
bars.197

This observation applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Not only does the prevailing
interpretation and application of that provision threaten to
196 Habeas corpus "review," unlike direct appellate review of state-court
judgments by the Supreme Court of state-court judgments, to which the
independent-and-adequate-state-ground rule applies, does not threaten to produce
an unconstitutional advisory opinion or to interfere with a state's implementation of
its own law. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
The essential difference is that the Supreme Court, on direct review, can
only reverse and remand [a case] to the state courts. It cannot secure the
prisoner's release directly, and it is from this deficiency in power that the
problem arises of advisory opinion or invasion of the [s]tate's legal
preserve. Since the federal habeas corpus court does not function under
any such limitation on its power, it is confronted by no such dilemma.
Brennan, supra note 78, at 436. Hence, the constitutional and other ills, real or
perceived, that may arise were federal courts to review state-court judgments in
disregard of the independent-and-adequate-state-ground rule not only do not apply
in the federal habeas context, the opposite effect obtains: Because habeas corpus can
only release the prisoner and compel a retrial, it encourages state courts to apply
federal law accurately while at the same time enabling them to elaborate and
develop state law independently. Ordering the discharge and retrial of a person does
not require a federal habeas court to pass or trespass on a state court's right to
interpret state law. It respects that law within the confines of overarching
constitutional norms.
197 Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 826
(1994).
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modify a critical sui generis privilege in the American
constitutional system, it compels federal courts to engage in
arcane, and often needless, technical analyses that can preclude
the vindication or clarification -ofconstitutional rights. AEDPA's
habeas provisions,, designed to streamline the habeas process
and avert federal scrutiny of state-court "adjudications on the
merits," in practice frequently prolong that process and lead
federal courts to scrutinize state-court decisions at length in
order to adhere to the Byzantine requirements mandated by
AEDPA and Supreme Court precedent.
AEDPA's habeas provisions therefore prove to be needless
and counterproductive in this regard, even measured against
their purported objectives of federalism, comity, and judicial
efficiency. But until Congress modifies those provisions-and
assuming, as seems likely, that the Supreme Court will not find
them constitutionally infirm-the viability, meaningfulness, and
efficiency of federal habeas corpus can be preserved to some
extent by reducing the circumstances under which the tortuous
standard of review prescribed by § 2254(d)(1) applies, by limiting
it to those cases in which a true adjudication on the merits took
place. Because textual analysis of § 2254(d) bears equally well
the alternative construction articulated in Washington, because
the jurisprudence and history of federal habeas corpus support
it, and because it better serves the values of federalism, comity,
and judicial efficiency, that construction of § 2254(d) should, I
believe, be reconsidered. Nothing could be clearer than the right
of, indeed imperative for, federal courts to interpret ambiguous
statutes in a manner that comports with precedent, history, and
' 198
the constitutional values that undergird "Our Federalism."

198 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see Press Release, Statement of
President William Jefferson Clinton on Anti-Terrorism Bill Signing 2-3 (Apr. 24,
1996), 1996 WL 203049 ("I am confident that the Federal courts will interpret these

provisions ...to preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the
bedrock constitutional principle of an independent judiciary .... I expect that the
courts, following their usual practice of construing ambiguous statutes to avoid
constitutional problems, will read [§ 2254(d)] to permit independent Federal court
review of constitutional claims").

